Formal and transcendental logic

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-XIX

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2. Introduction

   1. Introduction

      • Edmund Husserl

      Pages 1-17

3. Preparatory Considerations

   1. Preparatory Considerations

      • Edmund Husserl

      Pages 18-47

4. The Structures and the Sphere of Objective Formal Logic

   1. The Way from the Tradition to the Full Idea of Formal Logic

      1. Formal logic as apophantic analytics

         • Edmund Husserl

         Pages 48-71

      2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics

         • Edmund Husserl

         Pages 72-89

      3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities

         • Edmund Husserl

         Pages 90-104

   2. Phenomenological Clarification of the Two-Sidedness of Formal Logic as Formal Apophantics and Formal Ontology

      1. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments

         • Edmund Husserl

         Pages 105-129

      2. Apophantics, as theory of senses, and truth-logic

         • Edmund Husserl

         Pages 130-148

5. From Formal to Transcendental Logic

   1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic

      • Edmund Husserl

      Pages 149-175

   2. Initial questions of transcendental logic: problems concerning fundamental concepts

      • Edmund Husserl

      Pages 176-183

   3. The idealizing presuppositions of logic and the constitutive criticism of them

      • Edmund Husserl

      Pages 184-201

   4. Evidential criticism of logical principles carried back to evidential criticism of experience

      • Edmund Husserl

      Pages 202-222

   5. The subjective grounding of logic as a problem belonging to transcendental philosophy

      • Edmund Husserl

      Pages 223-231

   6. Transcendental phenomenology and intentional psychology. The problem of transcendental psychologism

      • Edmund Husserl

      Pages 232-266

   7. Objective logic and the phenomenology of reason

      • Edmund Husserl

      Pages 267-290

   8. Conclusion

      • Edmund Husserl

      Pages 291-293

6. Back Matter

   Pages 294-340

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called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas-as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modem sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modem times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a na!ivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate a priori possibilities and necessities.

• logic

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